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INTRODUCTION	  AND	  OBJECTIVES	  
	  
The	  announcement	  of	  U.S.	  Africa	  Command	  (USAFRICOM)	  in	  February	  2007	  kindled	  a	  flurry	  of	  
discussion	  amongst	  Africa	  watchers	  in	  Washington	  and	  beyond.	  	  Debate	  largely	  centered	  on	  the	  
implications	  of	  this	  announcement,	  the	  mission	  of	  the	  new	  Command,	   its	   location,	  and	  above	  
all,	   how	   USAFRICOM	   actions	   would	   reconcile	   with	   those	   of	   other	   players	   in	   the	   region	   and	  
whether	  the	  decision	  signified	  a	  militarization	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  in	  the	  region.	  	  The	  establishment	  of	  
the	   Command	   was	   interesting	   for	   reasons	   beyond	   these	   debates,	   for	   it	   signaled	   important	  
changes	  in	  how	  the	  U.S.	  Government	  (USG),	  particularly	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  perceived	  
the	  importance	  of	  Africa	  to	  U.S.	  strategic	  interests.	  	  
	  
With	  this	  current	  debate	  and	  attention,	  in	  October	  2008,	  the	  Advanced	  Systems	  and	  Concepts	  
Office	  of	   the	  Defense	  Threat	  Reduction	  Agency	   (DTRA-­‐ASCO)	   initiated	  a	   two-­‐phase	  project	   to	  
assess	   the	  nature	  of	   security	  and	   insecurity	   in	  Africa.	  The	   first	  phase	  was	  a	   two-­‐year	  analytic	  
effort,	   led	   by	   Jennifer	   Perry	   of	   DTRA-­‐ASCO,	   with	   support	   from	   Science	   Applications	  
International	   Corporation	   (SAIC),	   entitled	   “African	   Security	   Challenges:	   Now	   and	   Over	   the	  
Horizon.”	  This	  phase	   focused	  on	  mapping	   the	   terrain	  of	   a	  broad	   set	  of	   security	   challenges	   in	  
Africa	   and	   to	   explore	   their	   dimensions	   through	   a	   set	   of	   workshops—six	   issue-­‐focused	   small	  
discussion	   groups,	   solicited	   discussion	   papers	   that	   defined	   and	   analyzed	   the	   major	   security	  
challenges	  in	  Africa	  today,	  explored	  possibilities	  for	  what	  they	  might	  be	  over	  the	  horizon,	  and	  
identified	  implications	  for	  the	  USG.	  Reports	  summarizing	  each	  workshop/discussion	  group	  are	  
available,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   summary	   report	   of	   all	   of	   the	   research	   and	   analysis	   conducted	   in	   this	  
phase.	  	  The	  summary	  report	  can	  be	  obtained	  from	  the	  Homeland	  Security	  Digital	  Library	  of	  the	  
Naval	  Postgraduate	  School:	  http://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=716016).	  	  
	  	  	  
In	  the	  second	  phase,	  “African	  Security	  Challenges:	  Now	  and	  Over	  the	  Horizon	  Capstone,”	  ASCO	  
supported	  associate	  professor	  Jessica	  Piombo	  of	  the	  Naval	  Postgraduate	  School	  to	  oversee	  the	  
production	  of	  a	  collection	  of	  essays	  that	  would	  delve	  more	  deeply	   into	  a	  set	  of	   issues	  that,	   in	  
some	   cases,	   overlapped	   with	   the	   ones	   studied	   in	   the	   previous	   phase.	   This	   project	   brought	  
together	   the	   works	   of	   several	   scholars	   and	   built	   on	   the	   findings	   of	   the	   workshops	   and	  
discussion	  papers	  developed	  during	  phase	  one.	  Piombo	  commissioned	  a	  set	  of	  analytical	  essays	  
that	  would	  consider	  eight	  under-­‐studied	  security	  challenges	  that	  had	  far	  reaching	  implications	  
for	  the	  state	  of	  the	  current	  and	  emerging	  African	  security	  environment.	  These	  essays	  explicitly	  
considered	   how	   the	   issues	   manifest	   within	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   at	   multiple	   levels	   of	   analysis	  
(from	  individual	  to	  state	  to	  inter-­‐state	  security)	  and	  also	  how	  the	  various	  issues	  intersect	  with	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one	   another.	   The	   findings	   of	   that	   effort	   are	   summarized	   in	   this	   report.	   Individual	   papers	   are	  
available	  by	  request,	  and	  there	  are	  plans	  to	  publish	  the	  collection	  in	  a	  special	  report	  or	  edited	  
volume.	  	  
	  
The	  overall	  motivation	  for	  both	  phases	  of	  the	  project	  was	  that	  before	  assessing	  the	  nature	  of	  
U.S.	  security	  programs	  in	  Africa,	  it	  was	  particularly	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  complex	  nature	  
of	  these	  challenges.	  Once	  the	  basic	  challenges	  are	  mapped	  and	  understood,	  salient	  points	  for	  
U.S.	   foreign	   policies	   could	   be	   drawn	   out.	   Together,	   these	   study	   efforts	   have	   aimed	   to	   fill	   a	  
significant	  knowledge	  gap	  about	  understudied	  and	  emerging	  security	   threats	   in	  Africa.	   In	   this	  
region	  of	  the	  world,	  many	  problems	  lie	  outside	  traditional	  state	  security,	  and	  therefore	  it	  was	  
felt	   that	   analyzing	   these	   issues	   could	   enhance	   USG	   understanding	   of	   how	   various	   non-­‐
traditional	  issues	  affect	  security	  and	  insecurity	  more	  broadly.	  
	  
	  
Scope	  and	  Overview	  of	  the	  Capstone	  Project	  
In	  the	  second	  phase	  of	  the	  project,	  the	  methodology	  shifted	  to	  analyzing	  a	  set	  of	  security	  issues	  
at	  a	  deeper	  level,	   less	  explicitly	  focused	  on	  policy	  implications	  and	  more	  focused	  on	  exploring	  
the	  linkages	  between	  sets	  of	  issues.	  Within	  each	  issue,	  the	  academic	  researchers	  were	  asked	  to	  
assess	  how	  the	  challenge	  manifested	  at	  different	   levels,	   from	  the	   individual	   level	  and	  human	  
security	  to	  the	  state/international	  level	  and	  “traditional”	  security.	  	  
	  
One	  common	  thread	  through	  both	  phases	  of	  the	  project	  was	  that	  regardless	  of	  the	  issue	  being	  
discussed,	  the	  multi-­‐dimensionality	  and	  complexity	  of	  African	  security	  analysis	  made	  it	  difficult	  
to	   issue	   policy	   prescriptions.	   Therefore,	   in	   this	   second	   phase	   the	   goal	   was	   to	   focus	   on	   the	  
individual	  challenges	  and	  their	  related	  cross-­‐cutting	  issues	  with	  the	  intent	  of	  gaining	  a	  broader	  
perspective	   of	   how	   security	   problems	   emerge	   and	   manifest	   on	   the	   continent,	   but	   also	   to	  
identify	   those	   particular	   analytic	   and	   practical	   issues	   with	   which	   government,	   the	   research	  
community,	  and	  other	  actors	  within	  the	  region	  grapple	  to	  assess	  and	  address	  the	  challenges.	  	  	  
	  
For	  example,	  the	  discussions	  repeatedly	  revealed	  that	  there	  were	  both	  traditional	  and	  human	  
security	  dimensions	  which	  need	  to	  be	  assessed	  in	  each	  issue	  area.	  State-­‐level	  security	  problems	  
in	  Africa	  often	  stem	  from	  deeply-­‐rooted	  human	  security	  issues	  that	  manifest	  at	  individual	  and	  
community	   levels,	   such	  as	  poverty,	   inequality,	   and	   lack	  of	  opportunity.	  When	  combined	  with	  
closed,	  authoritarian,	  or	  corrupt	  political	  systems	  (state-­‐level	  factors),	  the	  ways	  that	  individuals	  
attempt	   to	   deal	   with	   these	   problems	   often	   generate	   state	   and	   inter-­‐state	   level	   security	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problems	   such	   as	   civil	   wars	   and	   cross-­‐border	   raids	   and	   militancy.	   Therefore,	   discussions	   of	  
security	  challenges	  in	  Africa	  must	  address	  both	  the	  traditional	  concepts	  of	  state-­‐centric	  national	  
security	  as	  conceived	   in	  politico-­‐military	  terms	  (arms	  rivalries,	  strategic	  alliances,	  defense	  and	  
military	  training)	  and	  dimensions	  of	  human	  security,	  to	  include:	  individual	  security	  and	  human	  
rights,	   economic	   prosperity,	   societal	   reconstruction	   and	   stabilization,	   regional	   organization	  
development,	   and	   capacity	   building	   for	   states	   and	   their	   institutions.1	   This	   perspective	   of	  
examining	   security	   challenges	   from	   multiple	   levels	   of	   analysis	   and	   focusing	   on	   the	   ways	   in	  
which	   different	   issues	   intersect	   with	   each	   other	   became	   one	   of	   the	   foundational	   guiding	  
principles	  for	  the	  second	  phase	  of	  the	  project.	  
	  
Methodology.	  To	  this	  end,	  this	  project	  phase	  aimed	  to	  grapple	  with	  these	  complexities	  in	  an	  in-­‐
depth,	   cohesive	   analysis	   that	   would	   be	   useful	   to	   both	   the	   academic	   and	   government	  
communities	   which	   are	   focused	   on	   particular	   issues	   and	   on	   African	   security	   more	   broadly.	  	  	  
Building	   on	   several	   of	   the	   focus	   areas	   from	   phase	   one,	   the	   research	   considers	   how	   these	  
complexities	   play	   out	   with	   respect	   to	   eight	   understudied	   issue	   areas,	   using	   integrated	   case	  
study	  and	  theoretical-­‐based	  analysis.	  The	  initial	  results	  are	  summarized	  in	  this	  report.	  The	  issue	  
areas	  and	  authors	  of	  the	  analytic	  essays	  are	   listed	  below,	  followed	  by	  summaries	  of	  the	  main	  
points	   of	   each	   essay.	   The	   section	   following	   the	   summaries	   pulls	   out	   salient	   points	   for	   the	  
government	  community.	  	  
	  
1. Displacement	  and	  militancy	  
Sarah	  Kenyon	  Lischer,	  Wake	  Forest	  University	  
2. Small	  arms	  and	  light	  weapons	  availability,	  proliferation,	  and	  use	  
Robert	  Muggah,	  Instituto	  de	  Relações	  Internacionais,	  Pontifícia	  Universidade	  Católica	  do	  
Rio	  de	  Janeiro;	  with	  Francis	  Sang,	  RECSA	  
3. Health,	  disease	  and	  human	  security	  
Alex	  Otieno,	  Temple	  University	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   The	   classic	   definition	   for	   “human	   security”	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	   1994	   United	   Nations	   Development	   Program	  
report.	   According	   to	   the	   UNDP,	   the	   concept	   of	   global	   security	   should	   be	   broadened	   to	   include	   aspects	   of	  
environmental	   security,	   food	   security,	   health	   security,	   environmental	   security,	   personal	   security,	   community	  
security,	   and	   political	   security.	   See	   http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/	   (accessed	   September	   21,	  
2009).	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ESSAY	  OVERVIEWS:	  MAIN	  ARGUMENTS	  AND	  FINDINGS	  
	  
1. Displacement	  and	  militancy	  	  
This	  essay,	  by	  Sarah	  Kenyon	  Lischer,	  examines	  the	  displacement-­‐related	  militarization	  challenge	  
in	  Africa	  and	  its	  intersection	  with	  threats	  to	  both	  human	  security	  and	  traditional	  international	  
security.	  It	  analyzes	  the	  current	  displacement	  situation	  in	  Africa	  and	  discusses	  numerous	  actual	  
or	   potential	   militarization	   risks,	   such	   as	   theft	   of	   resources,	   attacks	   on	   camps,	   demographic	  
engineering,	  the	  use	  of	  displaced	  persons	  camps	  as	  sanctuaries	  for	  militants,	  risks	  of	  escalating	  
international	  war,	  and	   international	   terrorism.	  The	  case	  of	   the	  transnational	  conflict	  affecting	  
Chad	   and	   Sudan	   provides	   an	   example	   of	   those	   displacement-­‐related	   threats.	   The	   essay	  
concludes	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  how	  forced	  displacement	  and	  militarization	  relate	  to	  emerging	  
trends	   in	   African	   security.	   It	   also	   considers	   the	   implications	   of	   these	   relationships	   at	   the	  
individual,	  state,	  and	  regional	  levels.	  
	  
Argument	  and	  Findings:	   In	  Africa,	  as	  elsewhere,	  human	  security	  and	  international	  security	  
threats	  can	  overlap	  and	  create	  mutually	  destructive	  patterns,	  especially	  since	  destabilizing	  
human	   security	   has	   become	   a	  major	   strategic	   objective	   in	  many	  African	   conflicts.	   Armed	  
groups,	  in	  particular	  those	  that	  seek	  to	  control	  natural	  resources,	  need	  only	  terrorize	  or	  kill	  
civilian	   populations	   to	   achieve	   their	   aims.	   The	   resulting	   massive	   displacement	   further	  
erodes	  human	  security	  as	  the	  refugees	  and	  internally	  displaced	  suffer	  disease,	  hunger	  and	  
violence.	  	  
	  
A	   related	   security	   threat	   arises	   from	   the	   transnational	   nature	   of	   many	   African	   conflicts.	  
Spillover	  often	  results	  from	  refugee	  flows	  and	  rebel	  movements,	  creating	  regional	  webs	  of	  
conflict.	  These	  conflicts	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  international	  war	  due	  to	  the	  use	  of	  cross-­‐
border	  rebel	  sanctuaries	  and	  resulting	  hot	  pursuit	  attacks.	  Relying	  on	  the	  porous	  nature	  of	  
many	   African	   borders,	   such	   webs	   of	   conflict	   have	   flourished	   and	   greatly	   complicated	  
resolution	   efforts.	   In	   addition,	   regional	   security	   threats	   from	   conflict	   spillover	   may	   have	  
international	  security	  repercussions	  due	  to	  global	  concerns	  such	  as	  terrorist	  networks	  and	  
oil	   supply.	   Lischer	   identifies	   distinct	   individual-­‐	   and	   group-­‐level	   threats	   for	   militarization	  
among	  displaced	  populations.	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2. Small	  arms	  and	  light	  weapons	  availability,	  proliferation,	  and	  use	  
This	  essay,	  by	  Robert	  Muggah	  with	  Francis	  Sang,	   identifies	  and	  considers	  issue	  related	  to	  the	  
influx	   of	   such	   weapons	   into	   (and	   within)	   Africa	   and	   issues	   surrounding	   the	   demand	   for,	  
possession,	  and	  use	  of	  these	  weapons	  in	  the	  region.	  	  It	  seeks	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  these	  issues	  
inform	  the	  broader	  study	  of	  African	  conflicts	  and	  economic	  and	  political	  stability.	  Finally,	  the	  
essay	  reappraises	  how	  small	  arms	  and	  light	  weapons	  control	  is	  both	  conceived	  and	  enacted	  in	  
Africa.	  	  
	  
Argument	  and	  Findings:	  Many	  African	  governments,	  multilateral	  and	  bilateral	  donors	  and	  
advocacy	  organizations	  are	  preoccupied	  with	  the	  way	  small	  arms	  and	  light	  weapons	  trigger	  
and	  sustain	  armed	  conflicts.	  Over	  the	  past	  decade	  the	  international	  community	  has	  initiated	  
politically	   and	   in	   some	   cases	   legally	   binding	   norms	   and	   rules	   to	   reducing	   the	   “supply”	   of	  
such	   weaponry	   to	   war	   zones	   and	   associated	   hot	   spots.	   Dealing	   with	   left-­‐over	   arms,	  
munitions	  and	  former	  combatants	  when	  armed	  conflicts	  come	  to	  an	  end	  has	  also	  assumed	  
growing	  importance.	  Not	  only	  does	  armed	  violence	  undermine	  national	  security,	  but	  it	  can	  
quickly	  spread	  from	  rural	  to	  urban	  areas,	  thereby	  threatening	  sub-­‐national	  stability.	  What	  is	  
more,	   armed	   violence	   can	   also	   move	   across	   porous	   borders	   into	   neighboring	   countries	  
threatening	  regional	  and	  ultimately	  international	  peace	  and	  security.	  	  This	  is	  most	  obviously	  
the	   case	  with	   simmering	  pastoral	  disputes	  on	   the	  borders	  of	  Kenya	  and	  Uganda	  and	  also	  
insurgency	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  Lord’s	  Resistance	  Army	  (LRA)	  from	  Uganda	  to	  the	  Democratic	  
Republic	   of	   Congo	   (DRC)	   and	   Sudan.	   Especially	   when	   combined	   with	   pervasive	  
underdevelopment,	   an	   abundance	   of	   assault	   rifles,	   grenades	   and	   handguns	   in	   Africa	   are	  
thus	  reconstituted	  as	  major	  threats	  to	  local,	  national	  and	  regional	  stability.	  	  	  	  
	  
Muggah	   and	   Sang	   argue	   that,	   if	   security	   is	   to	   be	   enhanced,	   it	   is	   critical	   for	   African	  
governments	  and	  their	  supporters	  to	  move	  beyond	  a	  rigid	  interpretation	  of	  arms	  availability	  
in	  solely	  supply-­‐side	  terms.	  The	  current	  focus	  on	  export	  and	  import	  controls,	  regulation	  of	  
brokering	   and	   promoting	   border	   and	   airway	   controls	   on	   trafficking,	   while	   necessary,	   is	  
insufficient	  to	  stop	  arms	  proliferation.	  Interventions	  must	  be	  expanded	  to	  account	  for	  how	  
weapons	   are	   “demanded,”	   that	   is,	   the	   multiple	   ways	   in	   which	   they	   are	   acquired,	   re-­‐
circulated	  and	  used.	  A	  particularly	  important	  entry-­‐point	  relates	  to	  weapons	  diversion	  from	  
military	  and	  police	  stocks,	  the	  distribution	  of	  weapons	  to	  armed	  groups	  and	  proxies,	  and	  the	  
incremental,	  yet	  no	   less	   important,	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  civilians	  transfer	  arms	  for	  profit	  
and	  self-­‐defense.	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Drawing	   on	   a	   new	   but	   nascent	   evidence	   base,	   the	   authors	   urge	   a	   more	   expansive	  
perspective	  that	  moves	  beyond	  narrow	  supply-­‐side	  approaches	  to	  regulating	  the	  authorized	  
and	   unauthorized	   trade,	   including	   illicit	   trafficking	   and	   brokering.	   Muggah	   and	   Sang	   call	  
instead	   for	   an	   approach	   that	   accounts	   for	   both	   supply	   and	   demand	   dimensions.	   At	   a	  
minimum,	   such	   an	   approach	  would	   encourage	  more	  oversight	   and	   control	   over	   domestic	  
production	  and	  surplus	  diversion	  and	  consider	  how	  the	  complex	  political	  economy	  of	  armed	  
violence	  shapes	  patterns	  of	  weapons	  acquisition	  and	  misuse.	  
	  
3. Health,	  disease	  and	  human	  security	  
This	  essay,	  by	  Alex	  Otieno,	  reviews	  the	   inter-­‐relationships	  between	  various	  facets	  of	  security	  
ranging	   from	   economic,	   food,	   environmental,	   personal,	   community,	   state	   (political)	   and	  
international	   security	   and	   their	   implications	   for	  health	   and	  well-­‐being	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.	  	  
Although	  dimensions	  of	  disease/biological	  security	  problems	  can	  and	  should	  be	  studied	  with	  a	  
development	   and	   public	   health	   lens,	   a	   security	   lens	   can	   also	   be	   employed	   to	   understand	  
aspects	  of	  the	  problems.	  Otieno	  examines	  how	  health	  issues	  (epidemics,	  chronic	  disease,	  etc.)	  
create	   security	   challenges	   at	   the	   micro	   (individual)	   and	   macro	   (state,	   interstate)	   levels.	   In	  
addition	   to	   broadly	   considering	   traditional	   African	   disease	   issues	  with	   this	   lens,	   Otieno	   also	  
considers	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   naturally-­‐occurring	   biological	   agents	   and	   materials	   may	   be	  
viewed	  as	  a	  security	  issue	  and	  understand	  (if	  appropriate)	  the	  nature	  of	  that	  issue.	  
	  
Argument	   and	   Findings:	   In	   this	   essay,	   Otieno	   argues	   that	   it	   is	   helpful	   to	   adopt	   a	  
multidimensional	  approach	  to	  analyze	  the	  public	  health	  agenda	  in	  African	  countries	  and	  the	  
security	   challenges	   posed	   by	   health	   and	   disease	   considerations.	   This	   approach	   explicitly	  
links	   factors	   associated	   with	   health	   and	   illness	   at	   the	   individual,	   community,	   state	   and	  
regional	   levels,	   rather	   than	   focusing	   on	   characteristics	   of	   individuals,	   such	   as	   ethnicity	   or	  
socio-­‐economic	   status.	   Exploring	   multidimensionality	   is	   especially	   important	   for	  
understanding	   health	   challenges	   in	   specific	   countries	   as	   well	   as	   sub-­‐regions	   where	  
environmental	   and	   structural	   level	   factors	   (such	   as	   droughts	   and	   conflicts	   respectively)	  
generate	  ripples	  of	  impacts	  that	  affect	  individuals,	  communities,	  and	  national	  governments.	  	  	  
	  
From	   around	   the	   year	   2000	   onwards,	   the	   poor	   health	   status	   and	   the	   population	   health	  
challenges	  arising	   from	  the	   threats	  posed	  by	   the	  spread	  of	  diseases	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  
resulted	  in	  greater	  emphasis	  being	  given	  to	  the	  need	  for	  improved	  disease	  monitoring	  and	  
surveillance.	  	  Variations	  in	  critical	  health	  issues	  within	  and	  between	  countries	  have	  also	  led	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to	   the	  need	   for	  work	   focused	  on	   identifying	   the	  nuances	   in	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   specific	  
factors	  are	  threats	  to	  national	  health.	  	  
	  
For	  an	  example	  of	  these	  inter-­‐relationships,	  consider	  infectious	  diseases,	  which	  destabilize	  
communities	  through	  multiple	  mechanisms.	  These	  include:	  	  the	  fear	  of	  spread	  and/or	  panic	  
of	   transmission;	   the	   rejection	   of	   or	   discrimination	   against	   infected	   individuals	   or	   groups;	  
demographic	   shifts	   caused	  by	  diseases	   (creation	  of	   large	  numbers	  of	  orphans,	   loss	  of	  age	  
groups,	   decreased	   life	   expectancy);	   the	   loss	   of	   productive	   capacity	   in	   the	   community	  
resulting	   from	   sickness	   and	   death;	   the	   diversion	   of	   medical	   resources	   from	   preventive	  
services	  such	  as	  basic	  immunization,	  prenatal	  care	  etc.	  Together,	  these	  often	  cumulate	  into	  
increased	   poverty,	   loss	   of	   trust	   in	   government	   and	   political	   unrest,	   and	   loss	   of	   hope.	  	  
Infectious	   diseases	   further	   impact	   individuals,	   communities	   and	   societies	   at	   large	   and	  
epidemics	   pose	   a	   threat	   to	   states	   by	   interrupting	   trade	   and	   commerce	   as	   well	   as	   free	  
movement	   of	   people.	   Additionally,	   because	   infectious	   diseases	   in	   particular	   compromise	  
the	  safety	  of	  communities	  and	  societies,	  they	  have	  been	  recognized	  as	  not	  just	  public	  health	  
but	   also	   a	   security	   problem.	   Thus,	   a	   multidimensional	   approach	   to	   health	   security	   is	  
necessary	   given	   the	   variety	   of	   sectors	   that	   would	   be	   involved	   in	   tackling	   security	  
implications	  of	  health	  challenges	  	  
	  
The	  issues	  addressed	  in	  this	  essay	  are	  considered	  from	  the	  vantage	  point	  that	  all	  nations	  are	  
likely	  to	  be	  engaged	  in	  addressing	  threats	  to	  health	  security	  anywhere	  in	  the	  world	  owing	  to	  
the	   transnational	   nature	   and	   global	   consequences	   of	   events	   such	   as	   famine	   “…disease,	  
pollution,	  drug	  trafficking,	  terrorism,	  ethnic	  disputes	  and	  social	  disintegration…”	  	  	  While	  the	  
issues	   in	   this	   essay	   are	   discussed	   thematically,	   the	   essay	   introduces	   examples	   of	   key	  
incidences	  that	  have	  had	  individual,	  community,	  national	  and	  international	  impacts.	  	  	  
	  
4. Food	  security	  and	  conflict	  
This	   essay,	   by	   Ellen	  Messer,	   assesses	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   food	   security	  
issues	  and	  conflict-­‐based	  ones	  in	  Africa	  and	  considers	  other	  security	   issues	  which	  need	  to	  be	  
examined	   when	   considering	   the	   relationship	   between	   food	   security	   and	   broader	   African	  
security	   concerns.	   The	   essay	   describes	   both	   general	   cases	   and	   specific	   examples	   that	  
demonstrate	  food	  insecurity	  as	  a	  cause	  of	  conflict,	  conflict	  as	  a	  cause	  of	  food	  insecurity,	  and	  
human	   rights	   violations	   and	   demands	   underlying	   both	   food	   insecurity	   and	   violence	   as	   root	  
causes.	  It	  also	  shows	  how	  food	  and	  livelihood	  insecurity,	  especially	  in	  conflict-­‐prone	  contexts,	  
interact	  with	  other	  security	  threats,	  including	  climate	  change,	  labor-­‐decimating	  disease,	  small	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arms	   proliferation,	   and	   criminal	   cross-­‐border	   economic	   activities,	   which	   render	   all	   these	  
security	  threats	  more	  lethal	  and	  intractable.	  	  	  
	  
Argument	   and	   Findings:	   Two	   questions	   that	   have	   long	   troubled	   food,	   security,	   and	  
development	  experts	  are	  why	  sub-­‐Saharan	  African	  countries	  appear	  so	  prone	  to	  food	  and	  
other	   security	   crises,	   and	   how	   these	  multiple	   security	   threats	   are	   related.	   	   In	   this	   essay	  
Messer	   argues	   that	   the	   use	   of	   food	   or	   hunger	   as	   a	  weapon	   and	   the	   food	   insecurity	   that	  
lingers	   as	   a	   legacy	   of	   past	   conflicts	   account	   for	   a	   large	   proportion	   of	   these	   politically	  
destabilizing	  food-­‐insecurity	  situations.	  	  
	  
Messer	   focuses,	   in	   particular,	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   “food	   wars:”	   situations	   in	   which	  
combatants	  use	  control	  over	  food	  supplies	  as	  a	  weapon	  and	  starvation	  as	  a	  political	  tool	  to	  
destroy	  political	  opponents	  and	  attract	  hungry	  recruits.	   	   In	   food	  wars,	  scorched	  earth	  and	  
asset-­‐stripping	  tactics	  produce	  both	  immediate	  and	  longer	  term	  food-­‐insecurity,	  which	  can	  
decimate	  agricultural	  populations	  and	  livelihoods	  for	  years.	  	  	  
	  
Destruction	  of	   legitimate	  agricultural	   livelihoods,	  often	   coupled	  with	   recruitment	   to	  more	  
violent	   occupations,	   are	   another	   outcome,	   with	   multi-­‐generational	   social	   consequences	  
that	  multiply	   into	   national	   political	   impacts.	   In	   fact,	   over	   the	   past	   fifteen	   years,	   17	   of	   22	  
countries	   that	   the	   Food	   and	   Agriculture	   Organization	   characterizes	   as	   “countries	   in	  
protracted	  crises”	   that	   combine	  extreme	   food	   insecurity	  with	  conflict	  and	  elevated	  needs	  
for	   humanitarian	   aid	   are	  African	   (Angola,	   Burundi,	   CAR,	   Chad,	   Congo,	  DRC,	   Cote	   d’Ivoire,	  
Eritrea,	   Ethiopia,	   Guinea,	   Kenya,	   Liberia,	   Sierra	   Leone,	   Somalia,	   Sudan,	   Uganda,	   and	  
Zimbabwe).	  
	  
5. Terrorism	  and	  ungoverned	  spaces	  
This	  essay,	  by	  Jessica	  Piombo,	  assesses	  those	  issues	  which	  need	  to	  be	  examined	  to	  determine	  
the	  extent	  of	  a	  current	  and/or	  potential	  terrorism	  threat	  in	  Africa.	  	  It	  does	  this	  by	  interrogating	  
the	   relationship	   between	   governance,	   state	   authority,	   and	   the	   rise	   of	   Islamist	   insurgencies	  
within	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.	  	  The	  chapter	  surveys	  the	  different	  types	  of	  radical	  and/or	  extremist	  
groups	  that	  exist	  on	  the	  continent	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  goals,	  motivations	  and	  intentions,	  and	  
includes	  a	  case	  study	  of	  Boko	  Haram	  in	  Nigeria.	  	  	  
	  
Argument	  and	  Findings:	   This	  essay	  analyzes	   the	   relationship	  between	  ungoverned	  spaces	  
and	  terrorism	  in	  Africa.	  	  Piombo	  argues	  that	  most	  Islamist	  movements	  are	  oriented	  towards	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and	   respond	   to	   domestic	   issues	   of	   economic	   opportunity	   and	   governance,	   rather	   than	  
seeking	   to	  wage	   international	   jihad	   against	  Western	   influence.	   The	   essay	   includes	   a	   case	  
study	  of	  Boko	  Haram	  in	  Nigeria,	  and	  includes	  extended	  references	  to	  al	  Shabaab	  in	  Somalia.	  
	  
In	   the	   first	   section,	   Piombo	   evaluates	   the	   concept	   of	   ungoverned	   spaces.	   This	   section	  
introduces	   the	   concept	   of	   governance	   without	   government,	   and	   discusses	   the	   reasons	  
behind	  the	  various	  degrees	  of	  formal	  government	  and	  political	  control	  that	  exist	  in	  various	  
parts	  of	  Africa.	  Understanding	  why	  various	  types	  of	  governance	  exist	  provides	  insights	  into	  
the	  types	  of	  groups	  that	  operate	  within.	  
	  
The	  second	  section	  of	  the	  essay	  then	  maps	  the	  ways	  that	  groups	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  have	  
developed	   and	   operated	   in	   these	   different	   environments.	   It	   advances	   an	   argument	   that	  
most	  of	  the	  “terrorist”	  groups	  in	  Africa	  are	  primarily	  domestically-­‐oriented,	  better	  qualified	  
as	  politicized	  Islamists	  and	  domestic	  insurgents,	  than	  internationally-­‐oriented	  global	  jihadist	  
terrorists.	  The	  few	  domestic	  groups	  that	  are	  linked	  in	  with	  the	  global	  networks	  have	  tended	  
to	  develop	   in	   states	  with	  a	   functioning	  economic	  system	  and	  some	  semblance	  of	  political	  
order.	  These	  states	  often	  serve	  as	  the	  places	  where	  groups	  operate	  in	  the	  medium	  to	  long-­‐
term,	   because	   here	   they	   have	   access	   to	   international	   banking	   systems,	   global	  
communications	  networks,	  can	  move	  around	  easily	  and	  yet	  are	  still	  able	  to	  avoid	  detection	  
by	  blending	  into	  dense	  urban	  communities.	  	  
	  
Piombo	  argues	   that	   transnational	   terrorist	   groups	   (i.e.,	   those	  not	  of	  African	  origin)	  utilize	  
the	   truly	   “ungoverned”	   spaces,	   those	  without	  any	   formal	   authority,	   as	  places	   in	  which	   to	  
hide	  temporarily,	  to	  seek	  recruits	  from	  among	  vulnerable	  populations,	  and	  as	  transit	  routes.	  
The	  transnational	  groups	  tend	  to	  avoid	  spending	  long	  amounts	  of	  time	  in	  territories	  without	  
any	  formal	  political	  or	  economic	  systems.	  No	  globally-­‐oriented	  Islamist	  terrorist	  group	  has	  
arisen	  in	  any	  sub-­‐Saharan	  African	  state.	  	  
	  
The	  one	  possible	  exception	  to	  this	  last	  conclusion,	  al	  Shabaab,	  presents	  an	  unusual	  case.	  Al	  
Shabaab	  originated	  in	  a	  country	  that	  has	  had	  no	  effective	  formal	  state	  regime	  (Somalia)	  for	  
over	  two	  decades.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  group	  evolved	  from	  a	  militia	  that	  had	  been	  developed	  by	  
the	   only	   government	   that	   had	   been	   able	   to	   exert	   control	   over	   a	   significant	   territorial	  
expanse	  since	  1991,	  but	  which	  had	  been	  dismantled	  by	  foreign	  invasion	  –	  the	  Islamic	  Courts	  
Union.	   In	   this	   case,	   local	   Islamists	   view	   the	   international	   community	   to	   be	   actively	  
preventing	  the	  generation	  of	  an	  organically-­‐grown	  government.	  The	  essay	  argues	  that	  even	  
P a g e  | 11 
 
here,	   however,	   the	   primary	   goals	   are	   national	   –	   the	   liberation	   of	   Somalia	   from	   foreign	  
interference.	   Because	   international	   actors	   keep	   the	   transitional	   regime	   operating,	   they	  
become	   targets;	   the	   goal	   is	   not	   the	   international	   jihad	   advanced	   by	   Middle	   Eastern	  
Islamists.	  	  
	  
6. Maritime	  security	  
This	  essay,	  by	  Donna	  Nincic,	  assesses	  the	  current	  and/or	  potential	  maritime	  security	  threat	  in	  
Africa,	   including,	   but	   not	   limited	   to,	   piracy.	   	   	   Nincic	   identifies	   the	   nature	   of	   five	   maritime	  
security	   challenges	   in	  Africa	   at	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	   twenty-­‐first	   century,	   and	   explores	   their	  
implications	  for	  traditional,	  human	  and	  environmental	  security.	  	  
	  
Argument	  and	  Findings:	  Maritime	  security	  in	  Africa	  can	  be	  conceptualized	  as	  encompassing	  
five	  separate	  but	  inter-­‐related	  issue	  areas:	  1)	  maritime	  piracy;	  2)	  maritime	  terrorism;	  3)	  port	  
and	   sea	   lane	   security,	   including	  maritime	   smuggling;	  4)	   fisheries	   conflict;	   and	  5)	  maritime	  
energy	  conflict.	  	  In	  many	  cases	  in	  Africa,	  more	  than	  one	  of	  these	  issues	  is	  present.	  	  
	  
Nincic	   argues	   that	   it	   is	   important	   to	   explore	   the	   “root	   causes”	   of	  maritime	   challenges	   in	  
Africa	   from	   a	   human	   security	   perspective	   with	   a	   specific	   emphasis	   on	   environmental	  
security.	   If	   the	   ultimate	   goal	   is	   to	   address	  maritime	   security	   concerns	  with	   the	   intent	   of	  
providing	   options	   for	   viable	   and	   long-­‐term	   solutions,	   she	   asserts,	   adopting	   foundational	  
approaches	  which	  address	  the	  root	  causes	  of	  the	  problem	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  of	  the	  more	  value	  
than	  simply	  focusing	  on	  the	  symptoms	  of	  these	  drivers.	  
	  
Piracy	   is	  a	  significant	  challenge	  to	  African	  maritime	  security	  and	  global	   trade,	  but	   it	   is	  not	  
the	  only	  maritime	  security	  concern	  in	  Africa.	  	  Maritime	  piracy	  –	  which	  tends	  to	  get	  the	  most	  
attention	   –	   is	   actually	   increasingly	   interwoven	   with	   all	   other	   maritime	   security	   issues.	  
Wwhile	   no	  maritime	   terrorist	   events	   have	   occurred	   in	   Africa	   per	   se,	   the	   rise	   of	   terrorist	  
groups	  with	  developing	  maritime	  capabilities	  –	  specifically	  al	  Shabaab	   in	  Somalia	  –	   is,	  and	  
will	  continue	  to	  be,	  of	  concern.	  	  
	  
Maritime	  smuggling	  is	  an	  increasingly	  widespread:	  African	  ports	  are	  emerging	  as	  significant	  
“throughputs”	  for	  the	  global	  drug	  trade,	  and	  local	  sea	  lanes	  of	  communication	  (SLOCs)	  are	  a	  
concern	   for	   the	   transportation	   of	   illegal	   weapons	   and	   weapons	   components.	   Fisheries	  
conflict	   in	   Africa	   takes	   two	   general	   forms:	   1)	   Illegal,	   unregulated	   and	   unreported	   (IUU)	  
fishing,	  and	  2)	  disputes	  over	  access	  to	  fisheries	  grounds.	  	  IUU	  fishing	  off	  the	  coasts	  of	  West	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and	  East	  Africa	  are	  among	   the	  highest	   in	   the	  world,	   creating	   stresses	  on	   local	   economies	  
and	  leading	  to	  other	  security	  problems.	  	  
	  
Maritime	   energy	   conflict	   and	   security	   takes	   two	   essential	   forms	   in	   Africa:	   Attacks	   on	   oil	  
shipping	   and	   maritime	   infrastructure	   by	   pirate	   and	   militant	   groups,	   and	   unresolved	  
maritime	  boundary	  disputes	  in	  areas	  of	  abundant	  oil	  reserves	  .	  	  
	  
7.	  	  African	  militaries	  in	  the	  21st	  century	  
This	  essay,	  by	  Herbert	  Howe,	  identifies	  and	  maps	  the	  changing	  roles	  of	  African	  militaries	  and	  
considers	   how	   these	   shifts	  may	   demonstrate	   changing	   perceptions	   of	   security	   issues	   in	   and	  
across	   particular	   African	   contexts.	   	   It	   also	   considers	   the	   extent	   to	   which,	   in	   some	   African	  
contexts,	  these	  shifts	  might	  contribute	  or	  inform	  the	  development	  of	  emerging	  security	  issues	  
which	  need	  to	  be	  addressed.	  	  	  
	  
Argument	   and	   Findings:	   	   This	   study	   traces	   three	   military	   variables—political	   loyalty,	  
operational	  capabilities,	  and	  deployment	  mandate—over	  time	  and	  examines	  how	  they	  have	  
affected	  human	  security;	  that	  is,	  protecting	  a	  country’s	  population	  from	  political,	  economic,	  
and	  environmental	  threats.	  Great	  variation	  has	  always	  existed	  between	  African	  forces,	  but	  
several	   general	   continental	   trends	   appeared	   between	   1960	   (and	   the	   start	   of	   African	  
independence)	  and	  1990	  (and	  the	  ending	  of	  the	  Cold	  War).	  	  During	  that	  time,	  personal	  rule	  
manipulated	  and	  weakened	  the	  military	  by	  structuring	  its	  loyalty	  to	  the	  regime	  rather	  than	  
to	  the	  constitution	  and	  the	  citizens.	  The	  strategies	  by	  which	  rulers	  in	  these	  systems	  exerted	  
control	   over	   their	   militaries	   promoted	   personal	   loyalty,	   but	   decreased	   operational	  
capabilities.	  These	  tactics	   included	  direct	  control,	  personal	  (mostly	  economic)	  co-­‐option	  of	  
the	  military	   purpose	   from	   state	   to	   regime	   (personalized)	   protection;	   ethnicization	   of	   the	  
military,	   and	   increasing	   the	   number	   of	   units	   while	   fostering	   competition	   between	   them.	  
Additionally,	  rulers	  encouraged	  soldiers	  to	  seek	  out	  financial	  opportunities	  from	  their	  public	  
positions,	  especially	  soldiers	  belonging	  to	  the	  ruler’s	  ethnic	  group.	  	  In	  order	  to	  curb	  any	  anti-­‐
regime	   sentiment,	   the	   post-­‐colonial	   patrimonial	   regimes	  would	   persecute	   those	  who	   did	  
not	  comply.	  
	  
Today,	  personal	  control	  of	  the	  military	  continues	  in	  many	  countries,	  despite	  the	  continent’s	  
post-­‐1990	   democratization.	   Significant	   and	   serious	   challenges	   remain.	   Tactics	   as	  wasteful	  
procurement	  and	  personal	  cooption	  continue	  to	  restrict	  operational	  capabilities	  and	  human	  
security.	   Many	   national	   militaries	   will	   continue	   to	   suffer	   from	   problems	   of	   corruption,	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procurement,	  training,	  and	  health	  (all	  reviewed	  within	  the	  essay).	  Costly	  but	  operationally	  
irrelevant	   procurement	   persists.	   For	   example,	   in	   1999	   the	   South	   African	   defense	  
establishment	  purchased	  $11	  billion-­‐worth	  of	  combat	  and	  trainer	  aircraft,	  naval	  corvettes,	  
and	   submarines,	   which	   not	   only	   are	   inappropriate	   for	   the	   roles	   that	   the	   South	   African	  
National	  Defense	  Force	  undertakes,	  but	  also	  were	  so	  costly	  to	  maintain	  that	  by	  2010	  most	  
had	   been	   mothballed.	   Maritime	   capabilities	   against	   poaching,	   piracy,	   smuggling,	   and	  
disasters	   still	   remain	   woefully	   lacking.	   Airlift	   will	   remain	   a	   major	   problem	   for	   force	  
projection,	   especially	   peacekeeping	   and	   peace	   enforcement.	   	   Nigeria	   and	   Ethiopia	   have	  
limited	   strategic	   lift,	   but	   several	   countries,	   e.g.,	   South	   Africa,	   have	   lost	   significant	   air	  
capabilities,	   and	   most	   countries	   will	   continue	   to	   rely	   on	   western	   countries	   and/or	   the	  
private	  sector	  for	  any	  sizable	  international	  deployment.	  
	  
Despite	  continuing	  challenges,	  there	  are	  positive	  trends	  in	  the	  continent’s	  militaries.	  Howe	  
argues	  that	  three	  trends	  in	  particular	  may	  assist	  human	  security:	  Africa’s	  drop	  in	  coups,	  an	  
overall	   (although	   still	   limited)	   rise	   in	   operational	   military	   capabilities,	   and	   the	   greater	  
willingness	  of	  African	   states	   to	   cooperate	   in	  humanitarian	   interventions	  and	   to	  engage	   in	  
collective	  security.	  These	  should	  assist	  both	  regime	  and	  human	  security.	  The	  turn	  towards	  
collective	   security	   (regional	   peacekeeping,	   the	   African	   Standby	   Force,	   and	   collaborative	  
maritime	  initiatives)	  and	  the	  interest	  of	  many	  African	  militaries	  to	  develop	  disaster	  response	  
capabilities	   reflect	   particularly	   important	   developments	   in	   African	   military	   cultures	   and	  
operating	  stances.	  	  
	  
The	  changing	  degree	  of	  cooperation	  with	  other	  national	  security	  agencies	  (often,	  police)	  to	  
cooperatively	   secure	   borders	   and	   combat	   poaching	   in	   valuable	   wildlife	   sanctuaries	  
represents	   an	   additional	   new	   trend	   in	   how	   the	   missions	   of	   African	   militaries	   are	   being	  
developed,	  and	   reflects	  a	   changing	  norm	  of	  national	   security:	  away	   from	  traditional	   state	  
security	   and	   towards	   the	   protection	   of	   critical	   national	   economic	   assets.	   These	   trends	  
reflect	  a	  turn	  away	  from	  the	  state-­‐based	  sovereignty	  concept	  endorsed	  by	  the	  Organization	  
of	   African	   Unity	   towards	   the	   more	   people-­‐centered	   security	   concept	   advanced	   by	   the	  
African	  Union.	  	  
	  
	  
	   	  




1. Displacement	  and	  militancy	  
	  
General	  Implications	  
The	   relationship	   between	   displacement-­‐related	  militarization	   and	   the	   security	   framework	  
poses	  many	  challenges	  in	  the	  context	  of	  trends	  in	  African	  security.	  Potential	  interveners	  will	  
face	   difficult	   decisions	   and	   trade-­‐offs.	   In	   easy	   cases,	   the	   twin	   goals	   of	   traditional	  
/international	  and	  human	  security	  will	  complement	  each	  other.	  Policymakers	  will	  be	  more	  
challenged	  when	  human	  and	  traditional/international	  security	  goals	  are	  incompatible.	  	  
	  
In	   the	  more	   difficult	   cases,	   providing	   individuals	   safety	   from	   human	   rights	   atrocities	   and	  
threats	  to	  their	  survival	  may	  clash	  with	  measures	  that	  would	  strengthen	  state	  security.	  This	  
is	   particularly	   true	   when	   the	   state	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	   human	   security	   threats.	   Such	  
dilemmas	  will	   require	   external	   actors	   to	   understand	   the	   causes	   of	   displacement	   and	   the	  
motivations	  of	  militant	  actors	  before	  committing	  valuable	  resources.	  
	  
Specific	  Policy	  Points	  
• Border	  control	  and	  cross-­‐border	  violence	  represent	  one	  concrete	  issue	  area	  for	  policy	  
action.	  African	  militaries	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  threaten	  or	  protect	  displaced	  
populations.	  Which	  role	  they	  take	  depends	  on	  the	  capacity	  and	  willingness	  of	  the	  state	  
to	  maintain	  control	  over	  the	  border.	  Many	  borders,	  such	  as	  that	  between	  Chad	  and	  
Sudan,	  are	  porous	  and	  virtually	  unguarded	  (some	  would	  say	  nonexistent),	  allowing	  
cross-­‐border	  attacks	  against	  displaced	  people	  and	  local	  residents.	  	  
o In	  some	  cases,	  the	  central	  state	  lacks	  control	  over	  its	  periphery.	  In	  other	  cases,	  
the	  state	  willingly	  permits,	  or	  engages	  in,	  cross-­‐border	  attacks	  against	  refugees.	  
The	  issue	  of	  weak	  capacity	  is	  more	  amenable	  to	  external	  involvement	  by	  
international	  actors.	  	  
o More	  effective	  border	  control	  could	  prevent	  the	  free	  flow	  of	  fighters	  (both	  
rebels	  and	  government	  forces)	  and	  lootable	  resources.	  	  
o A	  humanitarian	  concern,	  however,	  is	  that	  states	  will	  use	  increased	  border	  
security	  to	  deny	  entry	  to	  refugees	  and	  asylum	  seekers.	  Increasing	  state	  capacity	  
should	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  training	  in	  international	  law	  regarding	  refugee	  
protection.	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• The	  growing	  involvement	  in	  peacekeeping	  by	  African	  states	  also	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  
refugee	  and	  IDP	  populations.	  	  
o In	  situations	  where	  the	  receiving	  state	  is	  willing,	  but	  unable,	  to	  provide	  security	  
for	  refugees,	  external	  training	  and	  funding	  for	  peacekeepers	  could	  help	  protect	  
the	  displaced	  populations.	  	  
o The	  effectiveness	  of	  this	  policy	  depends	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  receiving	  state	  in	  the	  
cause	  of	  the	  militarization.	  	  A	  hostile	  state,	  such	  as	  the	  government	  of	  Sudan,	  is	  
unlikely	  to	  allow	  such	  protection	  programs,	  since	  the	  state	  benefits	  from	  the	  
insecurity	  that	  affects	  IDPs.	  
• Repatriation,	  voluntary	  or	  coerced,	  is	  often	  viewed	  as	  the	  only	  feasible	  solution	  for	  
displaced	  populations.	  The	  preference	  for	  repatriation	  is	  based	  on	  a	  largely	  
unquestioned	  assumption	  that	  repatriation	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  stability	  are	  compatible.	  
Yet,	  repatriation	  (especially	  of	  previously	  militarized	  exiles)	  may	  actually	  exacerbate	  
traditional	  security	  threats	  and	  weaken	  human	  security	  in	  the	  home	  country.	  	  
o Given	  this,	  advocating	  repatriation	  as	  a	  solution	  for	  displaced	  persons	  must	  be	  
done	  after	  careful	  assessment	  of	  potential	  consequences.	  
o Additionally,	  actions	  to	  prevent	  a	  forced	  or	  militarized	  return	  will	  strengthen	  
post-­‐conflict	  stability.	  
o In	  the	  wake	  of	  conflict,	  peacekeepers	  or	  other	  international	  forces	  can	  
encourage	  return	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  Assistance	  could	  be	  as	  simple	  as	  helping	  
with	  logistics	  (such	  as	  transportation)	  or	  as	  broad	  as	  contributing	  to	  post-­‐conflict	  
peace-­‐building	  in	  the	  home	  country.	  	  
	  
2. Small	  arms	  and	  light	  weapons	  availability,	  proliferation,	  and	  use	  
	  
General	  Implications	  
Supply-­‐side	  approaches	  to	  regulating	  small	  arms	  and	  light	  weapons	  tend	  to	  adopt	  common	  
theories	  of	  change.	  Practical	  disarmament	  interventions	  tend	  to	  proffer	  incentives	  (cash	  for	  
weapons)	  or	  sticks	  (forcible	  disarmament).	  These	  activities	  often	  generate	  far	  fewer	  returns	  
than	   expected,	   however.	   It	   is	   useful	   to	   interrogate	   the	   concepts	   of	   arms	   availability	   and	  
armed	  groups	  in	  order	  to	  account	  for	  the	  manifold	  ways	  arms	  are	  acquired	  and	  re-­‐circulated	  
as	  well	  as	  why	  and	  how	  armed	  groups	  mobilize	  to	  begin	  with.	  Such	  a	  reappraisal	  is	  essential	  
in	   order	   to	   design	   effective	   security	   promotion	   interventions	   in	   post-­‐conflict	   societies,	  
including	  in	  Africa.	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Policymakers	   concerned	   with	   arms	   availability	   often	   attribute	   their	   misuse	   and	   trade	   to	  
non-­‐state	   actors.	   Yet,	   armed	   groups	   seldom	  operate	   autonomously	   –	   they	   are	   frequently	  
deeply	   interconnected	   with	   formal	   and	   informal	   political	   elites	   who	   are	   themselves	  
integrated	   into	   clandestine	   rackets	   and	   (trans-­‐national)	   systems	   of	   profit	   and	   power.	  
Understanding	   the	   context	   in	   which	   violence	   becomes	   a	   viable	   (sometimes	   the	   only	  
potential)	   option,	   and	   then	   understanding	   the	   patterns	   of	   supply	   and	   demand	   for	   small	  
arms	  and	  light	  weapons	  is	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  any	  policy	  response	  to	  the	  issue.	  	  
	  
Specific	  Policy	  Points	  
• There	  is	  comparatively	  little	  evidence	  that	  muscular	  actions	  to	  stem	  new	  arms	  supplies	  
are	  effective	  in	  the	  medium	  to	  long	  term	  –	  certainly	  not	  unless	  they	  are	  combined	  with	  
other	  bottom-­‐up	  interventions	  focusing	  on	  the	  demand	  for	  small	  arms	  to	  begin	  with.	  
• In	  place	  of	  the	  traditional	  emphasis	  on	  focusing	  on	  arms	  supply,	  Muggah	  and	  Sang	  
recommend	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  “second	  generation”	  approach	  to	  arms-­‐related	  
insecurity.	  	  
o Second	  generation	  approaches	  seek	  to	  address	  the	  complex	  risk	  factors	  shaping	  
security	  complexes	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  	  
o They	  also	  focus	  on	  enhancing	  the	  resilience	  of	  local	  authority	  structures	  –	  
including	  customary	  institutions,	  tribal	  and	  clan	  elders,	  and	  village-­‐level	  public	  
authorities.	  	  	  
o Second	  generation	  interventions	  are	  most	  effective	  when	  they	  harness	  public-­‐
private	  partnerships,	  work	  directly	  with	  civil	  society	  and	  design	  and	  implement	  
armed	  violence	  prevention	  and	  reduction	  activities	  that	  are	  premised	  on	  
identified	  rather	  than	  imputed	  needs.	  
o A	  key	  innovation	  of	  these	  second	  generation	  interventions	  is	  their	  appreciation	  
of	  the	  way	  local	  context	  shapes	  arms	  availability	  rather	  than	  the	  other	  way	  
around.	  Second	  generation	  community-­‐based	  demobilization	  and	  reintegration,	  
security	  sector	  reform	  and	  civilian	  weapons	  collection	  emphasizes	  the	  
importance	  of	  building	  on	  local	  values	  and	  norms	  associated	  with	  gun	  possession	  
• There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  practical	  ways	  to	  enhance	  security	  governance	  and	  ultimately	  
reduce	  diversions	  and	  leakages	  from	  national	  stockpiles.	  	  
o It	  is	  critical	  that	  African	  governments	  and	  their	  security	  sectors	  start	  
implementing	  basic	  checks	  and	  balances	  and	  established	  management	  
practices.	  At	  a	  minimum,	  these	  actors	  must	  undertake	  routine	  and	  thorough	  
assessments	  of	  public	  armories,	  including	  those	  of	  military	  and	  policing	  entities.	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Basic	  inventories	  are	  critical	  and	  loopholes	  closed	  so	  that	  illegal	  transactions	  can	  
be	  caught	  and	  reduced.	  	  
o Security	  forces	  require	  careful	  vetting	  procedures,	  appropriate	  and	  regular	  
salaries	  and	  training	  in	  basic	  accountability	  principles.	  
o Small	  arms	  and	  light	  weapons	  control	  efforts	  need	  to	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  
heterogeneous	  characteristics	  of	  armed	  groups.	  A	  narrow	  conception	  of	  these	  
groups	  being	  motivated	  by	  rent-­‐seeking	  misses	  a	  wider	  set	  of	  interests	  ranging	  
from	  ideological	  and	  identity-­‐based	  motivations	  to	  concerns	  over	  common	  
property	  management,	  border	  disputes	  and	  self-­‐defense.	  
	  
3. Health,	  disease	  and	  human	  security	  
	  
General	  Implications	  
As	  multi-­‐level	   issues,	   the	   challenges	  of	   health	   and	  disease	   require	   transnational	   solutions	  
that	  are	  best	  facilitated	  through	  regional	  and	  international	  collaboration.	  	  This	  approach	  to	  
health	   security	   might	   be	   made	   most	   effective	   by	   multilateral	   and	   regional	   organizations	  
such	  as	  the	  World	  Health	  Organization	  (WHO)	  and	  the	  African	  Union	  (AU)	  as	  well	  as	  regional	  
economic	  and	  development	  organizations.	  	  	  
	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  national	  responses	  to	  health	  and	  human	  
security	  threats	  have	  been	  shaped	  less	  by	  budgetary	  and	  infrastructure	  constraints	  than	  by	  
conscious	   decisions	   by	   unaccountable	   or	   unresponsive	   regimes.	   	   	   The	   health	   and	   human	  
security	  agenda	  has	  also	  been	  shaped	  by	  whether	  it	  is	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  national	  security,	  
foreign	   policy,	   human	   rights,	   or	   global	   justice	   issues.	   	   There	   is	   potential	   value	   in	   linking	  
health	  and	  human	  security,	  as	  it	  may	  lead	  to	  prioritization	  of	  health	  equity,	  environmental	  
sustainability	  and	  poverty	  in	  the	  global	  development	  and	  foreign	  policy	  agendas.	  
	  
Specific	  Policy	  Points	  
• Effective	  preparedness	  and	  response	  to	  emerging	  or	  reemerging	  infectious	  diseases,	  
epidemics,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  naturally	  occurring	  pathogens	  to	  carry	  out	  terrorist	  attacks	  
include	  international	  collaboration	  and	  resource	  mobilization.	  	  	  	  
o The	  creation	  of	  a	  regional	  network	  of	  integrated	  surveillance	  and	  information	  
sharing	  would	  be	  a	  first	  step	  in	  this	  process.	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• Specialized	  training	  at	  national	  and	  international	  institutions	  for	  critical	  personnel	  will	  
be	  necessary	  alongside	  incentives	  for	  recruiting	  and	  retaining	  health	  professionals	  in	  
African	  countries	  given	  the	  migration	  of	  doctors	  and	  nurses	  to	  developed	  countries	  
o A	  comprehensive	  approach	  to	  disease	  eradication	  that	  affects	  vulnerable	  
populations	  whose	  susceptibility	  increases	  with	  malnutrition	  would	  have	  to	  deal	  
with	  nutritional	  insecurity	  instead	  of	  a	  limited	  approach	  that	  focuses	  only	  on	  
vaccination.	  	  	  
• Addressing	  nutritional	  insecurity	  has	  additional	  payoffs.	  Nutritional	  insecurity	  results	  in	  
susceptibility	  to	  colds,	  infections,	  headaches	  and	  asthma	  attacks	  well	  as	  increase	  in	  
chronic	  disease	  resulting	  in	  poorer	  health	  status	  and	  poor	  academic	  performance	  for	  
children.	  Additionally,	  hunger	  and	  malnutrition	  are	  riskier	  than	  AIDS,	  malaria	  and	  
tuberculosis	  combined.	  Addressing	  these	  issues	  becomes	  almost	  more	  important	  than	  
simply	  focusing	  on	  vaccinations.	  	  
• Similarly,	  efforts	  to	  combat	  water-­‐borne	  diseases	  need	  to	  consider	  both	  responding	  to	  
the	  specific	  outbreak,	  as	  well	  as	  addressing	  conditions	  that	  lead	  to	  contaminated	  water	  
systems	  or	  situations	  that	  put	  communities	  at	  risk	  (especially	  including	  refugee	  and	  IDP	  
scenarios,	  natural	  disasters,	  and	  conflict).	  	  
• African	  countries	  have	  favorable	  conditions	  for	  disease	  emergence	  and	  reemergence	  
owing	  to	  increased	  population	  density,	  ecological	  degradation,	  rapid	  transportation	  
technologies,	  migration	  and	  low	  or	  nonexistent	  disease	  surveillance	  and	  containment	  
capacities.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  critical	  for	  national	  governments	  of	  countries	  in	  the	  region	  to	  
take	  the	  necessary	  action	  aimed	  at	  changing	  all	  or	  some	  of	  these	  risks	  if	  they	  are	  to	  
succeed	  in	  keeping	  emerging	  and	  reemerging	  diseases	  under	  control.	  	  	  	  
• Effective	  surveillance	  will	  require	  involving	  inclusion	  of	  sectors	  that	  have	  not	  
traditionally	  been	  regarded	  as	  part	  of	  the	  public	  health	  establishment	  such	  as	  labor,	  the	  
military	  and	  other	  security	  sectors,	  education,	  immigration,	  communication,	  trade	  and	  
commerce	  to	  mention	  a	  few.	  
• Collaboration	  among	  agencies	  and	  institutions	  that	  deal	  with	  health	  and	  security	  
under	  the	  leadership	  and	  coordination	  of	  public	  health	  or	  a	  special	  institutes	  (as	  
deemed	  fit)	  would	  facilitate	  effective	  response	  to	  public	  health	  security	  events	  such	  as	  
cholera,	  polio	  or	  Ebola	  outbreaks,	  thereby	  enhancing	  prevention	  efforts	  through	  
production	  of	  accurate	  and	  consistent	  information	  regarding	  threats	  to	  health.	  
• Health	  information	  and	  communication	  technologies	  (ICT)	  can	  be	  used	  for	  surveillance	  	  
-­‐	  storing	  and	  monitoring	  data	  on	  the	  use	  and	  safety	  of	  biological	  agents	  in	  laboratories,	  
transmitting	  information	  to	  health	  professionals	  (including	  guidelines	  in	  clinical	  practice	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and	  recommended	  best	  practices),	  real-­‐time	  decision	  support	  by	  alerting	  health	  officials	  
about	  outbreaks	  of	  diseases	  or	  food	  insecurity	  patterns,	  and	  in	  epidemiological	  
research.	  	  	  	  
	  
4. Food	  security	  and	  conflict	  
	  
General	  Implications	  
Food	  security	   should	  be	  high	  on	   security	  agendas	  and	  conflict-­‐sensitivity	   integral	   to	   food-­‐
security	  planning.	  	  Joint	  efforts	  will	  require	  better	  coordination	  and	  integration	  of	  what	  are	  
still	   separate	   food	  and	  security	   interests.	   	   In	  particular,	   food	  and	  security	  must	  bridge	  the	  
division	  of	  labor	  between	  humanitarian-­‐disaster	  and	  economic-­‐development	  assistance	  that	  
characterizes	   United	   Nations	   (UN)	   and	   other	   international	   food	   agencies.	   	   Analogously,	  
conflict	   sensitivity	   and	   food-­‐wars	   attentiveness	  must	   enter	   into	  Millennium	  Development	  
Goals	   (MDGs),	   Human	   Right	   to	   Food	   (HRF),	   and	   other	   food-­‐security	   and	   economic-­‐
development	  planning.	  
	  
Specific	  Policy	  Points	  
• The	  conceptual	  and	  institutional	  divisions	  between	  analysts	  and	  policy	  professionals	  
working	  on	  food	  and	  agriculture	  and	  those	  in	  conflict	  and	  security	  pose	  barriers	  to	  
solutions.	  These	  two	  discourses	  and	  policy	  planning	  processes	  need	  to	  be	  better	  
integrated	  to	  account	  for	  the	  interrelationships	  between	  conflict	  and	  food	  (in)security.	  	  
• Proposals	  for	  action	  should	  demonstrate	  conflict	  sensitivity	  and/or	  pay	  special	  
attention	  to	  political,	  geographic,	  ethnic,	  and	  religious	  factors	  that	  might	  ignite	  conflict	  
in	  situations	  where	  people	  compete	  for	  land,	  water,	  and	  program	  resources.	  	  
• Utilizing	  the	  concept	  of	  food	  wars	  as	  a	  security	  framework	  can	  help	  policymakers	  to	  
connect	  food	  insecurity	  and	  conflict	  in	  both	  directions,	  and	  from	  there	  to	  adopt	  more	  
nuanced	  policies	  that	  do	  not	  exacerbate	  already-­‐dire	  situations.	  	  
o One	  first	  step	  might	  be	  to	  explore	  distinctive	  local	  African	  coping	  mechanisms,	  
and	  how	  people	  respond	  more	  or	  less	  effectively	  to	  the	  plethora	  of	  
environmental,	  global	  economic,	  political,	  and	  social	  challenges	  underway.	  
Outside	  assistance	  could	  seek	  to	  build	  on	  traditional	  social	  and	  coping	  
mechanisms,	  while	  also	  introducing	  new	  options.	  	  	  
o A	  second	  approach	  would	  be	  to	  encourage	  more	  conflict-­‐sensitive	  food-­‐system	  
planning.	  	  Analysts	  should	  document	  historical	  politically-­‐mobilized	  political-­‐
geographic-­‐ethnic-­‐religious	  (PGER)-­‐relations,	  map	  occupational	  structures,	  and	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movements,	  and	  make	  sure	  that	  humanitarian	  or	  development	  assistance	  does	  
not	  constrain,	  or	  if	  possible	  facilitates,	  such	  local	  responses.	  	  	  
o A	  related	  step	  demands	  attention	  to	  distinctive	  place-­‐specific	  land	  utilization	  
patterns.	  Simple	  land	  reform	  or	  individual	  land	  rights	  are	  not	  a	  solution	  where	  
landholding	  usually	  involves	  layers	  of	  customary	  hereditary	  and	  user	  rights,	  as	  
well	  as	  state	  assertions	  of	  control	  over	  property,	  plus	  additional	  kinship,	  
generational,	  and	  gendered	  rights	  of	  control	  over	  land,	  labor,	  water,	  and	  
product.	  
	  
5. Terrorism	  and	  ungoverned	  spaces	  
	  
General	  Implications	  
Mapping	   terrorism	  and	   terrorist	  movements	  onto	   the	  dynamic	  of	  ungoverned	  spaces	  and	  
simply	  conceiving	  of	  governance	  in	  physical	  terms,	  mis-­‐diagnoses	  the	  origins	  of	  many	  of	  the	  
Islamist	   movements	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   and	   how	   they	   operate	   in	   African	   societies.	  
Because	   “terrorism”	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   is	   often	   a	   form	   of	   protest	   against	   exploitive	  
governments,	  combating	  terrorism	  requires	  a	  larger	  approach	  than	  simply	  building	  capacity	  
in	  security	  agencies	  (militaries,	  police,	   intelligence,	  etc.)	  to	   identify	  and	  capture	  “terrorist”	  
groups	  and	  leaders.	  	  
	  
A	  more	   appropriate	   comprehensive	   approach	   involves	   aspects	   of	   promoting	   accountable	  
and	   inclusive	   governance,	   effective	   extension	   of	   state	   authority,	   promotion	   of	   political	  
inclusion	  and	  economic	  opportunity,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  security	  agencies	  that	  are	  not	  
manipulable	  by	  political	  agendas	  or	  open	  to	  societal	  penetration	  from	  below.	  	  
	  
Specific	  Policy	  Points	  
• Counter-­‐terrorism	  programs	  aimed	  at	  increasing	  security	  capacity	  must	  be	  
embedded	  within	  a	  responsive	  governance	  framework.	  
• Programs	  to	  increase	  economic	  opportunities	  and	  progress	  will	  help	  reduce	  the	  
conditions	  that	  lead	  to	  radicalization	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  
• International	  actors	  need	  to	  continue	  to	  remain	  cognizant	  of	  the	  opportunities	  
provided	  by	  their	  counter-­‐terrorism	  programs	  and	  the	  incentives	  these	  create	  for	  
governments	  to	  label	  political	  opposition	  terrorist.	  
• Programs	  that	  destroy	  locally-­‐grown	  systems	  of	  governance	  may	  open	  space	  for	  
radicalization.	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• Most	  cases	  of	  African	  “terrorism”	  are	  not	  like	  al	  Shabaab	  in	  Somalia;	  sensitivity	  to	  
local	  dynamics	  and	  motivations	  is	  critical	  in	  developing	  appropriate	  programs.	  	  
• Multi-­‐faceted	  programs	  like	  the	  Trans	  Sahel	  Counterterrorism	  Partnership	  (TSCTP)	  
have	  a	  greater	  chance	  of	  addressing	  the	  governance	  and	  economic	  challenges	  that	  
create	  Islamism	  than	  the	  more	  limited	  efforts	  like	  those	  of	  the	  Combined	  Joint	  Task	  
Force,	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  (CJTF-­‐HOA).	  The	  former	  is	  truly	  a	  whole	  of	  government	  effort,	  
while	  the	  latter	  is	  primarily	  a	  military	  endeavor	  that	  attempts	  to	  build	  in	  civilian	  
coordination.	  	  
	  
6. Maritime	  security	  
	  
General	  Implications	  
The	   professional	   and	   academic	   communities	   must	   do	   better	   at	   addressing	   the	  
interrelationships	   between	   maritime	   security	   challenges	   as	   part	   of	   their	   recommended	  
policies	  and	  solutions;	  and	  to	  view	  the	  whole	  of	  these	  concerns	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  human	  
security	   construct,	   rather	   than	  as	   traditional	   security	   threats.	   	  Maritime	  security	   concerns	  
are	   highly	   interlinked	   with	   each	   other	   and	   with	   many	   other	   security	   challenges	   in	   sub-­‐
Saharan	   Africa;	   as	   such	   their	   solutions	   should	   be	   addressed	   in	   an	   interlinked	   manner	  
drawing,	  as	  appropriate,	  from	  both	  traditional	  and	  human	  security	  approaches	  
	  
Specific	  Policy	  Points	  
• The	  close	  links	  between	  the	  categories	  of	  maritime	  security	  challenges	  suggest	  that	  that	  
coordination	  between	  agencies	  working	  in	  the	  distinct	  fields	  of	  counter-­‐piracy,	  
counter-­‐terrorism	  and	  illegal	  trafficking	  is	  necessary.	  	  
• Capacity	  building	  in	  port	  security	  and	  efficient	  operations,	  and	  infrastructural	  
development	  should	  be	  a	  high	  priority	  for	  USG	  and	  other	  actors.	  	  
o African	  countries	  have	  the	  least	  efficient	  ports	  in	  the	  world,	  suffering	  from	  poor	  
maintenance,	  infrastructure	  limitations,	  bureaucratic	  red	  tape,	  inadequate	  law	  
enforcement,	  and	  lax	  security.	  	  	  
o Lax	  port	  controls	  and	  ineffective	  or	  non-­‐existent	  patrolling	  of	  territorial	  waters	  
have	  led	  to	  the	  use	  of	  some	  African	  ports	  as	  entry	  points	  for	  the	  drug	  trade	  from	  
Latin	  and	  South	  America	  into	  Europe.	  
• Efforts	  to	  curb	  maritime	  piracy	  by	  patrolling	  the	  seas	  have	  seen	  some	  progress,	  and	  
should	  continue.	  There	  are,	  however,	  some	  possible	  scenarios	  that	  international	  actors	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should	  be	  prepared	  for,	  if	  successful	  attacks	  continue	  to	  decrease.	  These	  include	  the	  
potential	  that:	  
o Piracy	  may	  well	  become	  more	  violent	  against	  ships’	  crews	  as	  a	  form	  of	  
retaliation/desperation;	  	  
o Pirate	  gangs	  may	  begin	  to	  turn	  on	  each	  other	  in	  “turf	  wars,”	  creating	  more	  
violence	  within	  the	  country;	  	  
o Pirates	  may	  become	  co-­‐opted	  by	  the	  rising	  extremist	  movements	  on	  land	  (for	  
example,	  al	  Shabaab	  and	  Hizbul	  Islam);	  while	  
o Less	  successful	  pirates	  may	  begin	  to	  opt	  out	  of	  piracy,	  and	  return	  to	  their	  
subsistence	  livings	  (this	  would	  be	  a	  positive	  development,	  of	  course).	  	  
• Capacity	  building	  within	  African	  navy	  and	  littoral	  forces	  should	  continue.	  	  
o Improvements	  in	  the	  ability	  to	  patrol	  maritime	  exclusive	  economic	  zones	  (EEZs)	  
will	  help	  to	  ameliorate	  other	  conditions	  affecting	  maritime	  security	  –	  such	  as	  
illegal	  fishing,	  smuggling	  (drugs,	  weapons,	  people),	  and	  threats	  to	  environmental	  
security	  from	  oil	  bunkering.	  	  
• At	  the	  same	  time,	  land-­‐based	  efforts	  to	  ameliorate	  the	  causes	  that	  make	  piracy	  an	  
attractive	  option	  need	  to	  be	  increased.	  	  These	  fall	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  
o Economic	  development;	  
o Protecting	  fisheries	  and	  other	  maritime	  resources	  that	  pirates	  (initially)	  seek	  to	  
defend;	  and	  
o Improving	  political	  climates	  in	  countries	  where	  pirates	  are,	  in	  part,	  protesting	  
domestic	  policies	  (such	  as	  in	  the	  Niger	  Delta).	  	  
• Important	  distinctions	  between	  the	  drivers	  and	  consequences	  of	  piracy	  in	  the	  Gulf	  of	  
Aden	  and	  Gulf	  of	  Guinea	  should	  be	  considered	  when	  developing	  maritime	  piracy	  
programs.	  	  
o There	  is	  a	  stronger	  link	  between	  terrorist	  groups	  and	  piracy	  in	  East	  Africa	  than	  
West.	  	  
o Western	  African	  piracy,	  especially	  off	  the	  Nigerian	  coastline,	  tends	  to	  focused	  on	  
small	  ships	  involved	  in	  oil	  exploration,	  as	  opposed	  to	  East	  Africa,	  where	  larger	  
merchant	  ships	  are	  the	  primary	  (though	  obviously	  not	  sole)	  targets.	  	  
o Unlike	  Somalia,	  where	  the	  motives	  for	  piracy	  to	  date	  have	  been	  exclusively	  
financial,	  the	  reasons	  for	  maritime	  piracy	  in	  Nigeria	  have	  been	  more	  complex,	  in	  
that	  the	  pirates	  seek	  political	  objectives	  as	  well	  as	  financial	  gain.	  	  However,	  as	  in	  
Somalia,	  the	  piracy	  problem	  is	  rooted	  in	  part	  in	  a	  lack	  of	  economic	  opportunity.	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o Because	  West	  African	  governments	  are	  much	  stronger	  than	  the	  Somali	  
transitional	  government,	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  international	  community	  to	  intervene	  
in	  maritime	  piracy	  –	  really,	  any	  maritime	  conflict	  –	  in	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Guinea	  is	  much	  
more	  circumscribed.	  
• Careful	  attention	  needs	  to	  be	  paid	  to	  emerging	  trends	  in	  maritime	  terrorism.	  There	  
have	  been	  few	  maritime	  terrorist	  attacks,	  but	  maritime	  resources	  have	  been	  exploited	  
by	  extremist	  groups,	  which	  have	  utilized	  shipping	  lanes	  to	  transport	  people,	  
ammunitions,	  money	  and	  explosives.	  	  
o Some	  groups,	  such	  as	  al	  Shabaab	  and	  the	  Movement	  for	  the	  Emancipation	  of	  the	  
Niger	  Delta	  (not	  formally	  rated	  a	  terrorist	  group	  by	  the	  USG)	  have	  sought	  to	  
generate	  maritime	  capabilities	  either	  on	  their	  own	  or	  by	  working	  with	  pirate	  
groups.	  	  
• In	  regions	  already	  under	  threat	  by	  maritime	  piracy	  and	  fisheries	  violations,	  situations	  
can	  become	  more	  dangerous	  and	  fragile	  if	  pirate-­‐terrorist	  links,	  or	  links	  between	  
terrorist	  groups,	  deepen.	  
o Some	  terrorist	  groups	  claim	  to	  be	  addressing	  human	  and	  environmental	  security	  
issues.	  	  Hizbul	  Islam	  in	  Somalia,	  for	  example,	  draws	  a	  direct	  connection	  between	  
fisheries	  depletion	  due	  to	  IIU	  fishing	  and	  maritime	  crime	  in	  the	  country.	  	  It	  has	  
claimed	  that	  international	  anti-­‐piracy	  patrols	  protecting	  vessels	  from	  pirate	  
attack	  are	  actually	  protecting	  –	  inter	  alia	  –	  trawlers	  looting	  Somali	  fish	  stocks,	  
and	  are	  therefore	  contributing	  to	  the	  environmental	  devastation	  of	  the	  country.	  
This	  provides	  some	  measure	  of	  local	  legitimacy	  to	  the	  group,	  and	  demonstrates	  
the	  interrelated	  nature	  of	  the	  problem,	  requiring	  a	  comprehensive	  approach	  to	  
address	  it.	  	  
	  
7. African	  militaries	  in	  the	  21st	  century	  
	  
General	  Implications	  
First	   and	   foremost,	   a	   state’s	   political	   nature	   influences,	   but	   does	   not	   determine,	   the	  
professionalism	  of	  its	  military.	  	  Democratization	  and	  its	  values	  of	  meritocracy,	  transparency,	  
and	  accountability	   can	   (a)	  assist	   loyalty	   to	   the	  constitution	  and	   the	  citizenry,	   (b)	  promote	  
more	   rational	   defense	   budgets	   and	   promotions,	   (c)	   encourage	   proper	   military	   behavior	  
toward	  the	  citizenry,	  and	  (d)	  attract	  more	  foreign	  training	  and	  matériel.	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In	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  political	  democratization	  has	  achieved	  limited	  gains,	  including	  greater	  
political	   accountability	   and	   fewer	   military	   coups.	   But	   democratization	   has	   not	   yet	  
consolidated	  itself,	  and	  personal	  rulers	  often	  drape	  themselves	  with	  democratic	  trappings,	  
retaining	   inordinate	   power	   over	   still	   weak,	   countervailing	   institutions.	   These	   conditions	  
continue	  to	  deeply	  influence	  the	  functioning	  of	  African	  militaries.	  
	  
Specific	  Policy	  Points	  
• Security	  sector	  reform	  programs	  must	  attempt	  to	  adapt	  themselves	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  
the	  regime	  in	  which	  they	  are	  being	  enacted.	  
o If	  possible,	  governance	  reforms	  should	  pre-­‐date	  military	  training.	  Without	  this,	  
the	  system	  of	  rule	  is	  likely	  to	  undermine	  the	  ability	  to	  create	  greater	  operational	  
readiness,	  fight	  military	  corruption,	  and	  create	  capable	  military	  forces	  that	  will	  
be	  used	  to	  protect	  public	  goods.	  	  
o If	  governance	  reforms	  cannot	  be	  carried	  out	  before	  military	  training	  programs	  
begin,	  then	  security	  sector	  programs	  should	  be	  designed	  with	  specific	  ways	  to	  
help	  militaries	  to	  insulate	  themselves	  from	  political	  meddling,	  without	  creating	  
militaries	  that	  are	  unbound	  by	  civilian	  authority.	  Whether	  this	  is	  possible	  is	  
something	  that	  requires	  additional	  research	  and	  investigation.	  	  
• Effective	  civilian	  oversight	  requires	  specialized	  knowledge	  of	  the	  military,	  which	  African	  
civil	  society	  lacks.	  Therefore,	  investing	  in	  educating	  civilian	  sectors	  about	  military	  roles	  
and	  procedures	  could	  serve	  as	  a	  way	  to	  help	  reduce	  the	  accountability	  and	  oversight	  
gap.	  	  
• Increasing	  a	  military’s	  operational	  capabilities	  may	  sharpen	  a	  two-­‐edged	  sword,	  since	  
transferring	  technology	  often	  means	  losing	  control	  of	  how	  it	  will	  be	  used.	  ACOTA’s	  
political	  criteria,	  e.g.,	  requiring	  a	  state	  to	  be	  democratizing,	  are	  commendable,	  but	  a	  
future	  and	  less	  democratic	  regime	  could	  use	  the	  ACOTA-­‐furnished	  skills	  and	  equipment	  
to	  endanger	  human	  security.	  	  	  	  
• Providing	  counterterrorist	  capabilities	  to	  “antiterrorist”	  or	  mineral-­‐rich	  repressive	  
governments	  could	  also	  hurt	  the	  population.	  	  	  	  
• Finally,	  supplier	  nations	  may	  need	  to	  balance	  a	  domestic-­‐regional	  dilemma:	  upgrading	  
an	  armed	  force’s	  capabilities	  to	  defend	  a	  liberalizing	  government	  may	  also	  assist	  the	  
same	  force	  to	  invade	  a	  neighboring	  state	  (c.f.	  Rwanda’s	  repeated	  invasions	  into	  the	  
DRC).	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